

LANDMARKS IN HISTORY

Edited by BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
FRENCH ABSOLUTISM

(1574—1610)

by

FRANKLIN CHARLES PALM

*University of
California*

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(1574-1610)

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FRENCH ABSOLUTISM
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FRANKLIN CHARLES PALM, PH.D.

University of California

NEW YORK
F. S. CROFTS & CO.
1928

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PREFACE TO SERIES

The use of "source books" in college classes in history is a well-established practice. Most of the source books now available, however, cover a long period of time, and their contents consist chiefly of single extracts illustrating specific incidents or describing social and economic conditions; it is rarely possible with the material thus provided to study any topic satisfactorily. In recent years a new type of source book has appeared which provides a series of problems, each of which is set forth in considerable detail and often with conflicting evidence. But usually the problems are so long that only one or two of them can be used in a single course; moreover, the number of problems offered is small, and only a few aspects of history are covered.

The purpose of *Landmarks in History* is to provide a number of problems of moderate length, each of which will be bound and sold separately. Extracts from the chief sources for the study of each problem will be put together in such a way as to illustrate at once the course of events and the forces at work and, at the same time, to give students both a very fair idea of the mate-

rials from which history is written and of the methods of historical research. The problems will be short enough for several of them to be used during a year's course; the materials will be sufficiently varied to permit several kinds of exercises to be prepared; and the range of topics will, it is hoped, be wide enough to appeal to all kinds of tastes.

The series will cover the entire field of modern European history, from the Renaissance to the World War. A variety of problems are in active preparation, and it is planned to expand the list rapidly. In many cases source material in English translation will be made available for the first time. The co-operation of many well-known historians has been secured, and in general it may be said that each problem will be prepared by a scholar who has made a particular study of it.

These problems are offered to teachers of history with the conviction that they will supply a genuine need and that they will greatly facilitate that use of source materials, without which the teaching of history is likely to lose freshness and vitality.

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The University of Chicago,

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the government in its affairs. And finally, when a number of weak kings ascended the throne and Protestantism entered France, members of the third estate used the religious wars as a means to further their interests at the expense of the monarchy.

During the latter half of the sixteenth century the Protestants in France established a political as well as a religious organization. At first only a Christian sect, the Huguenots managed to retain their faith and convictions notwithstanding bitter opposition. But later the religious movement took a political direction. It associated with itself the ambitions of factions and the grievances of classes against the government. Wars fanned by fanatical hatred and political and social ambitions soon threatened to ruin France. Yet on all sides voices were raised in a plea for toleration and forbearance in the interest of the nation and of Christianity.

The religious struggles also gave certain noblemen an opportunity to put themselves at the head of powerful factions and enhance their authority. Members of the famous Montmorency family led one party, while their competitor was the great house of Guise. The Guises were closely attached to the royal line of France because of the marriage of their kinswoman, Mary Queen of Scots, to Francis II who in 1559 succeeded his father, Henry II, to the throne. His accession gave the Guises the opportunity to claim in France the su-

premacy they craved. But they encountered the strong opposition of the Montmorencys. In fact, the rivalry of these two families constituted the opening act of the drama in which the monarchy, faced by the danger of dissolution and determined to hold its historic prerogatives, strove desperately to maintain the balance of power between the two factions.

Happily, perhaps, Francis II died in 1560. At any rate the advent of the boy king, Charles IX, changed the situation in France. By skilful diplomacy Catherine, the queen mother, organized the government around herself as regent. Then she adopted various expedients to save the monarchy and at the same time to maintain her power. At first, by means of diplomacy and intrigue, she attempted to steer a middle course between the religious groups and political factions. Later, she tried to reconcile the antagonistic elements, and was assisted in that policy by the liberal-minded Chancellor de l'Hôpital, one of the early advocates of toleration and the supremacy of state interests over all religious or factional issues. But the difficulties were almost insuperable. Concessions granted the Huguenots, for example, caused the Catholics to form the famous Catholic League. Before long this organization threatened the existence not only of the Huguenots but the monarchy as well.

On the other hand, the Huguenots also became a political force. In 1572 it looked as though they,

led by the famous Admiral Coligny, might dominate the weak Charles IX. But Catherine and her ultra-Catholic associates checked their political as well as their religious aspirations by bringing about the unfortunate religious massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day (1572). Flaming with new bitterness, the Huguenots flocked to the standards of their leaders, swore revenge, and called upon all Protestants to come to their assistance. Catherine and her allies thus regained control of the government, but only to be confronted by a new outburst of civil wars. Then to make matters worse, in 1574, Henry III, another weak son of the famous queen mother, ascended the throne. Surrounded and influenced by male favourites, he was not physically, mentally, or morally fit to govern France. Dark days were ahead.

Certainly the latter half of the sixteenth century was a critical period in the history of France. By that time the religious struggles and the political rivalries, involving the weak central government during the reigns of Francis II, Charles IX, and Henry III, seemed to presage the inevitable downfall of the realm. Yet the forces which were to save the state were still at work even during the troublesome days of the religious wars. And gradually a new attitude toward the problems of the nation developed among certain political leaders in France. These men, either from personal or patriotic motives, came to the conclusion that the welfare of the state should supersede

all other interests. Hence they were determined to defend the government against the attacks of all internal or external decentralizing forces. These Politiques, as they were called, many of them liberal Catholic noblemen, maintained that the anti-monarchical tendencies of the religious wars had clearly demonstrated the necessity for toleration if France was to maintain her existence as a consolidated state and to protect herself against the attacks of foreign foes. The religious wars must end; and, like l'Hôpital, they believed that religious toleration alone could save the state.

But they found it difficult to accomplish their aims, even though they were led by a capable and powerful nobleman, Henry of Montmorency-Damville, governor of Languedoc. Matters went from bad to worse. During the latter part of the reign of Henry III it appeared as though the monarchy was doomed. Then a "man of the hour" appeared—Henry of Navarre. His advent marked the beginning of a new era in the development of the French monarchy.

DATA ON THE SOURCES¹

Aubigné, Agrippa d'. *Histoire universelle* (Société de l'histoire de France). Edited by Alphonse de Ruble. 10 vols. Paris, 1886-1909. Agrippa d'Aubigné (1552-1630) was a Huguenot poet and historian who participated in a number of the events described in his work. Although his history is an important source for a study of the religious wars, yet it should be read with caution, for the author, an enthusiastic Huguenot, wrote from that point of view.

Bibliothèque nationale, *Collection Dupuy* and *Collection française*. Containing numerous unpublished letters, edicts, ordinances, and other documents relating to this period. Many manuscripts have not been catalogued.

Calendar of state papers, foreign series of the reign of Elizabeth, preserved in the state department of Her Majesty's public record office. Edited by Rev. Joseph Stevenson, Allan James Crosby, Arthur John Butler, and Sophie Crawford Lomas. 21 vols. London, 1863 ff. In this collection are found full copies or digests of the dispatches and

¹ In some cases where the author, clearly referring to himself, has used the first person plural or the third person singular, the translator has adopted the first person singular.

papers of English representatives in France. Interested in the internal and external affairs of that country, these agents wrote reports of great value, although their information, in many cases, was based on rumor rather than on fact; they were, however, usually careful to indicate the source of their knowledge. At the present time the set is complete only to June, 1588.

Devic, Dom Claude, and Vaissete, Dom Jean Joseph. *Histoire générale de Languedoc*. 16 vols. Toulouse, 1872-1904. An excellent history of an important province in France. Volume XII contains carefully printed and well edited copies of a number of pertinent sixteenth-century documents, the originals of which are found in the various archives and libraries of France.

Dumont, Jean. *Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens*. 8 vols. Amsterdam, 1726-1731. A collection of treaties of alliances, of peace, of commerce, and of other important international agreements made by European nations. It covers the period from Charlemagne to 1726.

Henry IV. *Lettres intimes*. Edited by Louis Étienne Dussieux. Paris, 1876. A well selected and edited collection of letters written by Henry IV. Some of them, hitherto unpublished, are personal communications to his intimate friends. Thus they are of special value, for in them Henry IV reveals his personal side more clearly than in his "formal" writings.

Henry IV. *Recueil des lettres missives de Henry IV* (Collection de documents inédits). Edited by Berger de Xivrey and J. Gaudet. 9 vols. Paris, 1843-1876. The most extensive collection of Henry IV's letters available. The editor has selected the documents carefully, printing, for the most part, only those which throw light on the character and acts of this great ruler. An excellent introduction and many illuminating footnotes assist the reader in his study of the letters.

Mornay, Philippe de, *Seigneur du Plessis-Marly. Mémoires et correspondance*. 12 vols. Paris, 1824-1825. Duplessis-Mornay, 1549-1623) was a Huguenot nobleman, a writer of considerable ability, and a close friend and adviser of Henry IV. He was well educated, travelled extensively, and while on diplomatic missions studied economic as well as political and religious conditions in France, England, and other European states. As a member of the lesser nobility he understood the unfortunate condition of the lower classes during the civil wars, and, like other Huguenot leaders, became an enthusiastic advocate of numerous "reforms." In addition to the work of Mornay, the set also includes the *Mémoires* of Madame de Mornay. This unusual volume might well be described as the life of an illustrious husband written by an admiring wife.

Relations des ambassadeurs vénitiens sur les affaires de France au XVI siècle (Collection de

documents inédits). Collected and translated by M. N. Tommaseo, 2 vols. Paris, 1838. These papers contain the comments of diplomats who judged as historians and observed as men of affairs. Representing an important commercial city (Venice), interested in political, economic, religious, and social conditions in most European states, they were able to estimate with rare impartiality not only the acts of men but the course of events.

Sully, Maximilien de Béthune, *duc de . . . Mémoires, 1557-1611* (Collection. Edited by Petitot). Series II, vols. I-IX, Paris, 1820-1821). The duke of Sully (1560-1641) was an able, loyal, and conscientious Huguenot who, as chief minister of Henry IV, did much to restore law and order throughout the realm. By a rigorous financial administration he saved money for the king. At the same time he encouraged the economic development of France. As a man Sully was avaricious and exceedingly egotistical. Like Cellini, the famous autobiographer, Sully had an excellent opinion of himself. In consequence, he was apt to underestimate the importance of others. So in his works he exaggerates, distorts, and perhaps misinterprets many events. Yet the fact that Sully wrote his *Mémoires* makes them an important source for the period,—intensely interesting, but to be read with caution.

Sully, Maximilien de Béthune, *duc de. The Great Design of Henry IV*. With introduction

by Edwin D. Mead. Boston, 1909. The "Great Design" appeared originally in the last volume of Sully's *Mémoires*, although many references to it are scattered through preceding pages and volumes. Its authenticity has been the subject of long and heated debate. Many have charged Sully "not only with casting the 'Great Design' in the shape in which we have it, but with its sheer fabrication, for some purpose of his own." Yet it would appear that "the respective qualities of the mind of Henry and Sully" indicate that Henry might well have conceived the scheme, while Sully elaborated it.

Thou, Jacques Auguste de. *Histoire universelle depuis 1543 jusqu'en 1607, traduite sur l'édition latine de Londres*. 16 vols. London and Paris, 1734. Jacques Auguste de Thou (1553-1617) was a *Politique*. A close friend of Henry IV, and an influential member of the Parlement of Paris, he undoubtedly participated in many of the incidents described in his work. But his history is especially important because of its surprising impartiality. For example, he neither praises nor supports the administration of Henry IV. De Thou had a quite modern belief in the supremacy of the state and religious toleration.

THE SOURCES

PART I. THE MONARCHY IS THREATENED

1. *Devic and Vaissete, Histoire générale de Languedoc*, XIII, 1105-1111. [Extracts from the declaration and protest made by Marshal Damville, Montpellier, November 13, 1574.]

I, Henry of Montmorency, lord of Damville, marshal of France, and lieutenant-general for the king in Languedoc, want every one to know that my loyalty to the service of His Majesty and the repose of his subjects has caused me to oppose all enemies of the state. . . . I have for over fourteen years . . . seen this poor and desolated land injured in every way by civil wars, under the pretext of religion. . . . I am aware of unpunished massacres, assassinations, unjust imprisonments, popular uprisings, and other offences. . . . I realize that foreigners influence the king and his state to-day . . . instead of the princes of the blood and the French nobility. . . . In fact, since the death of King Henry II, the latter have been despised and foreigners have helped the king govern, contrary to the ancient laws of the realm. In so doing they have refused to recognize the

law of the state, formerly not equaled in any other country . . . and have tried to force the people to live as brute beasts. . . . I have made numerous remonstrances in behalf of the crown, the peers of France, and the provinces of the realm. All of these know that unless something is done they will be ruined, as well as the king.

As an officer of the crown, a native Frenchman, a descendant of a line of Christian barons who has always placed ahead of everything else the protection, conservation, and defense of his king and his realm, . . . I believe . . . that the religious question can not be settled by wars, but rather by a holy and free national or general council. Let us, therefore, restore things as they were in the past, and then, by the advice and deliberation of the Estates General, end the disturbances. I regret to see His Majesty controlled by persons who do not respect him and use his sacred name to hide their evil intentions and ambitions. Hence I have decided to protect, conserve, and defend his crown and his loyal subjects, regardless of their religious views, against these foreigners, workers of evil, oppressors and violators of the union and the welfare of the realm. . . . I invite all kings, princes, and Christian potentates, friends and allies, and faithful subjects of the crown to aid me, believing that God will favour our arms and that we may be able to reach a satisfactory agreement on the religious question

and restore the realm to its former position through the establishment and advice of the Estates General of France.

Further, I wish to inform all subjects of the king, regardless of rank . . . all provinces, and all towns of the kingdom that they will be given complete liberty of conscience in religious matters . . . and will be accorded the full and free enjoyment of those dignities, estates, revenues . . . which they possessed in the past. In fact I will take them under my protection, declaring all those opposing my commands enemies of France and of law and order.

2. *Calendar of state papers, foreign*, X, 586.

[Dr. Dale to Sir Water Mildmay, Treasurer of the Exchequer. December 29, 1574.]

Damville's protestation lacks neither reason nor courage. Damville is master of the field in Languedoc. . . . Those the King has of his own subjects he does not trust. A little piece of money might win the reiters to join with them.

3. Devic and Vaissete, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, XII, 1112-1113. [Act of Union adopted at Nîmes, January 10, 1575, by Catholic and Huguenot representatives, with the approval of Marshal Damville.]

The general assembly held in Nîmes in January, 1575, was summoned by Damville, . . . by the clergy and peaceful Catholics, and by the Hugue-

not churches in France.¹ Meeting to consider problems involving the common defense and the welfare and peace of France, they recognized the prince of Condé as their leader and in his absence, Damville. When the king ascended the throne they believed that the cruel and unfortunate civil wars were over . . . and that the ruler would establish peace. But instead of ending oppression and protecting them, His Majesty, badly advised by certain enemies of France who were near him, seemed inclined to oppose them more than ever. Therefore, after discussing the proposal to establish a Union and Confederation to resist, to conserve, and to defend their religion, lives, property, and honor against the injustice, violence, and barbarous cruelty of their enemies; after adopting the principle of religious toleration; and after deciding to do everything possible to reestablish the monarchy to its former dignity, the delegates drew up and accepted a plan for the common control of judicial, police, financial, and military power, subject of course to the approval of Marshal Damville. This agreement is as follows:

[The first act states that the Articles of Union were to be accepted and enforced by all assemblies in the provinces and cities represented in the meeting at Nîmes.]

¹ This is a contemporary account of the assembly held in Nîmes.

4. Devic and Vaissete, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, XII, 1135-1141.

[Articles presented by Marshal Damville to the assembly of Catholics and Huguenots held at Nîmes, January 12, 1575.]

I, Henry of Montmorency-Damville, marshal of France, and lieutenant-general for the king in Languedoc, realize that unless something is done to end the oppression, tyrannies, and violence, encouraged by certain evil royal advisers, His Majesty and subjects will be ruined. As a loyal officer of the crown I have always considered it my duty to oppose civil war, and to call upon all good and faithful subjects to offer their property and their lives for the restoration of the state and the maintenance of the monarchy.

Having been informed of the supplications and remonstrances made recently by representatives of a number of provinces, and by the delegates of the Huguenot churches . . . I was presented . . . to the assembly of Catholics and Huguenots at Nîmes. . . . There, as a loyal officer of the king, desirous of preserving the monarch and giving his subjects peace and liberty I promised to guard and observe the following agreements:

. . . I accept my nomination and election as head of the Union made by the assembly at Mil-lau and confirmed at the meeting in Nîmes. . . . I do this hoping that with God's help I shall perform the duties of this office well and maintain

the welfare of His Majesty and the peace of his subjects. I indeed appreciate and thank the assembly for the honor bestowed upon me. . . .

In performing my duties I intend to allow all subjects of the king, regardless of their religious beliefs or social standing, to enjoy their property and offices (subject, of course, to the regulations passed by this assembly). I also plan to establish religious toleration, while awaiting the decision made on this matter by a general council. . . .

Further, I shall not change my policy . . . without the consent of my Catholic and Huguenot constituents.

In fact I shall gladly receive and accept for my council persons elected by the assembly. These men are to advise me in matters involving the establishment and maintenance of law and order. I beg, however, that an equal number of representatives of each religion be selected for my council and that they also be . . . experienced men, capable of assisting me in drawing up ordinances. . . .

In the last place I promise and swear not to do anything which will injure the rights of one man more than another. Further, everyone must obey my laws, orders, and regulations, unless exempted by the advice of my council.

5. *Relations des ambassadeurs Vénitiens*, II, 229-235.

[Report of Jean Michel, 1575.]

Besides these causes of public discontent it is

necessary to mention the struggle between private interests which affect many individuals personally and which violently disturb the realm. Two of the most powerful houses hate and seek to annoy each other. Inasmuch as many persons are either dependent on or attached to them their enmity has completely divided the state. I speak not only of common people, but I include the royal counselors and the royal family itself. The Guises and the Montmorencys, as everyone knows, are the two houses. The numerous and important causes of their enmity are so well known that I will not discuss them. At any rate this mortal hatred is so bitter that there is little hope of seeing it appeased. Powerful men near the king are accustomed to it, and even encourage it. So this rivalry is really the nursery of the civil war. Implacable in their hatred the families continue the conflict, believing that it is to their interest to keep it up indefinitely. If the war should ruin the king, they would be pleased, feeling that they could be unrestrained in their hatred.

The Guises, during the wars, occupy the important positions in the king's party. With increased power they constantly look for new favours, meanwhile promising rewards to their partisans. . . . Their enemies are also strong. Marshal Damville, for example, is considered one of the outstanding leaders. No one in his party dares to compete with him; instead they yield to his commands. . . . His followers control a

large part of the kingdom, and carry on negotiations with and receive help from Germany and England. Marshal Damville even has relations with the ministers of Spain. Indeed all of the nations favour the continuation of discord and war in France. So supported by them Damville and his followers are well aware of their ability to resist the king. Further, while the conflict costs the king thousands of écus, Damville's adherents pay practically nothing, for they live on the people and also on the royal revenues.

It is evident that the weakness of Henry III in time of war increases the strength of his enemies. Peace would deprive the latter of their authority and partisans, perhaps forever. Meanwhile as long as the enmity between the factions lasts one of the two will endure. So, in the opinion of men well-informed on these affairs, Your Serenity may well despair of peace, for this is only possible if the people become obedient to their king. Of course extreme fatigue might cause one side to rest for a while. But as soon as one of the parties can find a way to start new troubles the war will be resumed.

This information should enable Your Serenity to appreciate conditions in France and to see what is ahead. Perhaps a foreign war in Flanders or in Italy might influence the factions to stop fighting each other. But the French lack the military power necessary for an external conflict. . . . Further, the king's brother, Damville, or the

duke of Montmorency, if appointed leaders of the expedition, would refuse to leave France for fear that they would be unable to return. . . . Leaders of the Guise faction comprehend the importance of foreign wars and regret not being able to take advantage of the troubles in Genoa. . . . They also realize the importance of foreign conflicts because of the change in the status of the peasant, thanks to the civil wars. Formerly the peasants did not participate in military life, but merely tilled the soil or carried on trade. Now they are armed, drilled, and trained in the arts of war, and if they can not be utilized in a foreign struggle they will become a menace to the nation. Trained from childhood to be soldiers they will not be able to earn a living when the wars end. Then led by noblemen they will revolt, pillage, and rob people throughout the land. This is a problem which merits serious consideration.

6. *Calendar of state papers, foreign*, XVIII, 427.

[Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, March 24, 1583.]

One of the King's Council here tells me they have advertisement of "some beginning of treaty" between the Pope and the King of Spain to deliver Avignon into the King of Spain's hands, taking some recompense in the Kingdom of Naples. I asked if the King would not "impeach" it. He answered he doubted whether he could, especially if Montmorency had intelligence with Spain; "and that thereupon the King had sent to Mont-

morency to content him better than he had done." In my opinion they had need to do so, for lately the King sent him a threatening message that (if he took not another course) he would deal with him not as a subject but as a rebel, would ruin all his houses and give away his lands. He answered mildly that he deserved no such thing at the king's hands and was sure that he would not use him in that manner. "But when he came to his last threatening article, which was that he would put his mother in prison, and take all she had from her, and utterly destroy and ruinate his house, he grew in a choler, and answered plainly that if the King would by his evil usage needs make him desperate, they would bring him to do that which, though it were to his own undoing and might cost him his life, yet the King perchance would repent it." Upon this report the King "remained astonied" and since is determined, as he says, to content him, and thereupon old Joyeuse would come hither.

7. De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, IX, 73.
[1583.]

Surrounded by factions the unhappy and alarmed prince² did not know what to do. On one side the ambitions of the Guises aroused his fear; while on the other hand he despised the religion of the king of Navarre. Moreover, he found it difficult to preserve friendly relations

² Henry III.

between Joyeuse and Nogaret³ by having them possess equal fortune, mutual friends, and the same political affiliations. The restless spirit of his mother also gave him concern. Desperate at seeing her influence over her son replaced by that of first one and then the other of the favourites, she did everything possible to recover power through the renewal of war, for she believed she had lost it while the country was at peace. That explains why she favoured the duke of Guise. She hoped that the civil war, which he planned, would enable her to act as a mediator between her son and him. Thus forcing the two parties to rely upon her judgment she would be mistress of the kingdom. With this in mind she always justified the suspicions held of the Guises, appeased the anger of the king, and frustrated all attempts . . . to overthrow the plans of the factionists.

8. *Calendar of state papers, foreign*, XVIII, 370.

[Stafford to Walsingham, February 27, 1583.]

"*The King* keepeth a marvellous course in these preparations for war; for to the *King of Navarre's agent* and them of that side, if they be any way inquisitive . . . he answereth that they know best the advertisements that he hath of *the King of Spain's* practices, and leaveth to them to consider whether he have reason not to provide for it. To the *Dukes of Guise and Mayne*,

³ Épernon.

[he saith] he will have all his frontiers kept, and provided for the defence of himself, and that the *Protestants* arm in *Languedoc and Guienne*" and that he will make himself obeyed of all his subjects. "To others he giveth out it is against *Montmorency* and that he will be revenged of him for his dealing with the *King of Spain*, and openly saith he is sure the *King of Navarre, Prince of Condé, Protestants* and *Chastillon* will be true to him and forsake *Montmorency*.

9. De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, IX, 198-199.
[1584.]

Joyeuse and Épernon, dominating the court and the mind of Henry III, did everything possible to win the prince over to the side which each of them favored. The hatred of Joyeuse for the Protestants was well known, and his close alliance with the Guises left no one in doubt as to where his interest lay. Though Épernon was not any more friendly toward the Protestants than Joyeuse, yet people believed that Épernon favored them, either because of his jealousy of his rival, or because he believed that the party led by the king of Navarre, largely composed of Huguenots, was fundamentally the most just. Perhaps that is why he visited the king of Navarre, under pretext of going to pay his respects to his mother whom he had not seen since the king's favor had raised him to his brilliant position. Further, Henry III had ordered Épernon to make every effort to induce the prince to return to the bosom

of the Catholic church and to the court. Épernon was to inform Navarre that his conversions would not only work to his advantage, since by the death of Brabant he was the closest heir of the crown, but also that it was absolutely necessary for the peace of the realm. Besides [if he became a Catholic] he would frustrate the schemes of the Guises, for they would not be able to start trouble in France, if the religious differences were settled. In fact, the conversion of Navarre would deprive the Guises of the favor of the common people, their chief supporters. Finally, [Épernon was to inform Navarre] that the king would offer him most liberal terms if he were willing to carry out these conditions.

10. Device and Vaissete, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, XII, 1414-1415. [Henry III to Sieurs de Poigny and Pontcarré, March 8, 1585.]

The last point concerns the proposed journey of my cousin ⁴ to Castres. According to . . . the king of Navarre's letters to Montmorency, they are to meet there to confer on the ways and means of capturing the strongholds and forts still occupied in Rouergue. Although you have been invited to attend, I appreciate your determination not to make the trip until you had consulted me on the matter. Now I trust you, and shall be glad to have you visit Castres and find out what is going on. I also believe that by your presence

⁴The duke of Montmorency.

you will be able to facilitate wise moves and block the bad ones.

11. Henry IV, *Lettres intimes* 60-61. [Henry of Navarre to Monsieur de Segur, about March 25, 1585.]

Monsieur de Segur, I come to this place⁵ to meet my cousin, Monsieur de Montmorency, and to confer with him concerning what should be done about the publication of a new and cruel law revoking the edict of pacification.⁶ In this matter all honest, virtuous people, good Frenchmen, and allies of the crown, have considerable interest, because the adherents of the Catholic league, authors of the edict of revocation, are up in arms and have forced the king to grant them their unjust demands. By this means they have disturbed the peace and . . . tranquility of the land. Further, by that illegal use of arms they plan to ruin not only the house of France, but also the state and its fundamental laws. At the same time they claim that they are merely trying to maintain their religion. Aware of their real intentions my cousin and I have resolved to oppose, to attack, to weaken, and, if possible, to exterminate them. To accomplish this we call to our aid all Christian princes, interested in our cause.

⁵ Castres.

⁶ The edict of Fleix (March 26, 1580), which ended the seventh civil war, reiterated the conditions of the edict of Bergerac (1577), which followed the sixth civil war, and gave the Protestants certain religious liberty, educational rights, political representation, and other advantages.

For the edict of revocation is not only an open declaration of war against all those who profess Protestantism, but it is also a masked attack upon the state and the royal house of France.

12. Mornay, *Mémoires*, III, 10-11. [Duplessis-Mornay to Henry of Montmorency, Montauban, March 30, 1585.]

My lord, you know that unrest exists everywhere. But we think that the safest policy is to see what form the fever will take before seeking to cure it, meanwhile keeping our finger on the invalid's pulse. This course of action, in my opinion, cannot be delayed, because the movements that have been going forward month by month, in the future will advance day by day and hour by hour as they approach the goal. *I think the war will be a sieve to sift out true Frenchmen, because, although those who are playing on its stage are dressed like Frenchmen, it is indeed evident that the author of the tragedy is a Spaniard.* If this uprising depended on those who seem to be stirring up trouble, one would think that they would retreat. But suppose that it depends on one higher up? At any rate it has the appearance of going further, and everything we hear about it tends in that direction. I desire very much to see their declarations, because it will be possible to learn from them how to work out one's salvation.

My lord, no one will be able to aid the prince ⁷ with advice more than you. Previous affairs have

⁷ Henry of Navarre.

been mere games,—Frenchmen against Frenchmen. They have measured and tried each other's strength for a long time, one as impatient and as ready to grow tired as the other. New French forces are in the field, but led and guided by the spirit of Spain, which is the more ready to see us come to grief because we shall suffer alone and she will receive the profit. May God mock their plans and dissipate their thunder in smoke! I pray, my lord, that He will guard you and keep you in perfect health.

13. D'Aubigné, *Histoire universelle*, VI, 279.
[1585.]

He⁸ regretted his defection from the king of Navarre, for he wanted to be in the good grace of the rising sun, being aware of the sad setting of the reigning one, accompanied by the exaltation of his enemies.

14. Mornay, *Mémoires*, III, 463–468. [Extracts from the discourse on the high cost of living presented by Duplessis-Mornay to Catherine de Médicis, 1587.]

Things sold and retailed in France today are too dear. Some commodities cost four, six, and ten times as much as they did eighty years ago. This can be proved by comparing the prices paid then and now for lands, houses, fiefs, vineyards, woods, meadows, meats, wood, cloth, fruits and other necessities.

To prove the above statements consider first

⁸The duke of Montmorency.

the increased cost of food. This can be done by examining the taxes paid in all the provinces of France. One will then discover that the tax on *meslin* (mixture of wheat and rye), rye, barley, and wheat was based on a value one-tenth the worth of these commodities today. In fact . . . a hen, a kid, and other things paid by the vassal to his lord were valued at one-tenth, and even one-fifteenth their present selling price. . . .

Turning to wages of workmen we discover, through a study of the tax lists kept during the last sixty years, that in the summer a man is paid six deniers for a day's work; while in the winter he receives four deniers. . . . A few years ago a man was paid twelve deniers and a woman six deniers for a day's work.

. . . In the past an acre of the best arable land in level country sold only for ten or twelve écus and a vineyard thirty écus. Today all these properties cost four times that amount.

It is possible to trace the increase in prices during the last sixty years. By consulting the records found in the chamber of accounts and in the treasury of charters one will discover, for example, that certain baronies, counties, and duchies, since annexed and united to the crown, yield today as much revenue as they cost at one time. There are several historians who claim that Humbert, Dauphin de Viennois, in 1349, sold Dauphiné to Philip of Valois, for 40,000 écus cash. . . . If that is true, people today would consider it a

cheap price indeed, for Dauphiné yields in revenues more than its selling price in 1349.

The same king, Philip of Valois, purchased the city of Montpellier for 25,000 gold florins. In this place there are today fifty houses, the smallest of which is worth as much as the city cost. . . .

Herpin, Count de Berry, wishing to go on the Crusades . . . sold his county to Philip I for 100,000 gold sols. Today this province yields nearly as much in revenue.

Now if you examine the selling price sixty years ago and the value today of houses, lands, meadows, vineyards, and other properties you will discover that they are worth six times their original value. One house in a city . . . sold for 1,000 écus sixty years ago; now it is worth 15,000 to 16,000 livres, although no repairs nor improvements have been made since it was built. . . .

Of course one must admit that sixty years ago a certain piece of land yielded products worth only 1,000 écus, while today its crops sell for six times that amount. At the same time let me call your attention to the fact that you can not purchase any more with 6,000 écus today than you could with 1,000 écus sixty years ago. In fact some things cost six, eight, ten, and twelve times as much.

We are all aware of the high cost of living and suffer because of it. Yet no one tries to remedy it. Nevertheless there are a number of reasons why this evil exists. In the first place, there is one

fundamental explanation, namely: the general disorders. But there are other causes developing out of the one mentioned above. The first is the abundance of gold and silver in the kingdom. This encourages luxury and excessive expenditure in foods, clothes, furnishings, buildings, and other extravagances. In fact the waste and dissipation of things constitute a second cause of excessive dearness, for where there is abundance there is waste. The monopolies of farmers, merchants, and artisans is a third reason. . . . Now we know that the properties of the king and of other landowners are farmed out to farmers and merchants who pay cash for the crops before they are gathered. Later these tenants press the grapes and put [the grain] in storehouses. This causes scarcity and consequently dearness. Then the farmers and merchants sell their products for the prices they want. The fourth cause is the . . . exportation of grains, wines, and other necessities . . . from the kingdom. Again the merchants, knowing that prices are high in Spain and Portugal, through their influence with certain favorites at court obtain permission to send their grains out of France. Obviously this exportation increases the prices of the exported commodities in France. The fifth cause is the huge sums of money kings and princes are willing to pay for luxuries . . . such as paintings and precious stones. Today these articles cost ten times as much as they did when kings were not interested in

them. Taxes on commodities and excessive tailles imposed on the people constitute the sixth cause. The civil wars in France, the seventh cause, accompanied by the complete breakdown of law and order, has brought about a tremendous loss of life and of property. The eighth is the increase in the price of currency. While the ninth and last reason for high prices is the meager harvests of the past five or six years. In fact poor crops and the ravages of wars are the two scourges which have affected us for a long while.

THE SOURCES

PART II. THE MONARCHY IS SAVED

15. Henry IV, *Lettres missives*, III, 1-2. [Notice sent to the important cities of the kingdom, August 2, 1589.]

Dearly beloved, spurred on by their increasing fury and cruelty the enemies of king and state have even gone so far as to incite a Jacobin¹ to make an attempt on the life of our ruler. Admitted in good faith, because of his profession . . . this churchman must have thrust his sword into the king's stomach. At first the injury was not considered dangerous . . . but the king died tonight, leaving all his followers . . . resolved, as I am, to avenge this foul deed. . . . Since it has pleased God to call me . . . to the throne, I have considered seriously the problems confronting me. Aided by the sound advice of the prince and other important seigneurs, I have decided to do everything possible for the welfare and the conservation of the state. I do not plan to make any needless changes in the position of the Catholic religion. . . . Nor shall I, in any govern-

¹ A member of a monastic order of that name.

mental acts, fail to consider the true interests of the state.

16. Henry IV, *Lettres missives*, III, 336-337.
[Henry IV to the duke of Montmorency,
February 9, 1591.]

My cousin, in your letters I have noticed the complaints made by you and the Huguenots. In my opinion the trouble is due to their failure to observe my edicts. I intend to censure them and ask them hereafter to conform, until I have time to consider their grievances. As to their charge that the taxes are so high they cannot pay them, I beg you, my cousin, to do all you can to help them. In so doing disregard their religious beliefs, and try to make them see that as king I am trying to aid them by establishing peace. . . . Further, I want you to see that my edicts are obeyed. But if the Huguenots fail to carry them out . . . admonish them in a diplomatic way, and try to get them to conform. Avoid trouble, however, for I know that in all other ways they are loyal to me.

17. Henry IV, *Lettres missives*, III, 421-422.
[Henry IV to the duke of Montmorency,
July 8, 1591.]

My cousin, you remember that my first act when God placed me on the throne was to call an assembly of the princes, officers of the crown, and principal representatives of all classes. I did this in order to consult with them concerning the best way of abolishing the evils and misfortunes

afflicting the realm. You know that the meeting of this body has been postponed, probably because of the opposition of my enemies. Meanwhile increasing difficulties tend to diminish the chance of holding the convocation. Travel by road is more dangerous than ever, and the prince and other important representatives, without whom this meeting would not be a success, are so busy settling numerous problems in their own provinces that they find it impossible to leave. . . . While awaiting a more opportune time to hold the assembly, I have decided to consider a number of pressing matters, and to restore order as far as possible. Therefore I have called my cousin, the cardinal of Bourbon, and my council to meet me, and most of them have come. . . .

At our conferences we have discussed ways and means of establishing order, considering especially the causes of the uprisings which have been renewed recently and are more violent than ever. As a result we have decided that these disturbances are due to the violation and revocation of the edicts of pacification issued in 1585, and confirmed in 1588. So we have concluded that before we can hope to restore order we must consider the fundamental cause of the disturbances.

18. Bibliothèque nationale, *Collection Dupuy*, 62, fol. 6 (copy). [Henry of Montmorency to the pope, January 18, 1593.]

Most Holy Father, Your Holiness is the last refuge to which the afflicted may turn for peace.

. . . In fact the paternal care which Your Holiness has for the whole of Christendom gives us the assurance . . . that God, who guides the sacred acts of Your Holiness, will cause the salutary remedies to come from you which are necessary for the ills that afflict this desolated realm. It is this, most Holy Father, which has induced the princes of the blood, dukes, officers of the crown, prelates, and principal Catholic gentlemen of the realm, who render obedience to the king, and who represent all the Catholic estates thereof, to dispatch to Your Holiness the Marquis de Pizany. . . . It is his purpose to implore the intervention and assistance of Your Holiness for the solution of the troubles with which we are afflicted, to bring about the well-being and conservation of the Holy Catholic religion and the repose of this once flourishing monarchy. I regret, most Holy Father, that I was not with His Majesty at the time of the dispatch of the said marquis, so that I could send my most humble supplication and add my signature. Nevertheless, I always desired this method of procedure, and long ago proposed it. I have decided too, that Your Holiness would not be annoyed, if, in addition to this worthy ambassador, I also should send the Sieur Silvano Justiniani, my steward, to kneel before you. He will give to the said lord marquis not only my power of attorney, but also those of the count of Auvergne, the duke of Ventadour, my son-in-law,

and also the duke of Épernon, and the Sieurs d'Ornano, de La Guiche, de Rassignac, de Chazernon, and de Chattes, who are leaders in Languedoc, Dauphiné, Provence, Lymosin, Auvergne, Bourbonnoys, Vellay, and other provinces, or, in other words, the largest part of the realm. We do this, most Holy Father, in order that we may be so fortunate as to render ourselves agreeable to Your Holiness through our very humble supplications. In this way we hope to cause you to cast your eyes upon the desolated realm and stretch out your hand to us, exercising your paternal power and opening to us a path which should conduct us to a good and salutary repose. You are the sole refuge we have. So we rest in the firm assurance that the Marquis de Pizany, who has full power, and upon whom the fortunes of the Catholics rest in this affair, will negotiate wisely so that we shall soon see the fruits of the journey which he has undertaken. Your Holiness, then, if it please you, will receive our petition. Furthermore, I humbly beg that you grant to me your friendship and benediction, for I am one who has never failed in the duty which I and all my house have toward the Holy See, and I, with all devotion, very humbly kiss the feet of Your Holiness.

Most Holy Father, I humbly pray the Creator to preserve Your Holiness for many years, with all happiness, health, and felicity.

19. Bibliothèque nationale, *Collection Dupuy*, 62, fol. 6 (copy). [Pope Clement VIII to Henry of Montmorency, May 1, 1593.]

Beloved son and nobleman, greeting and our apostolic blessing. It is easy to see from your letter what you suggest and what you want. We shall consider it, and as in all matters, but especially in public affairs, shall do what we think ought to be done to carry out God's plan. We beseech that the benevolent God will guide us and especially inform us as to the way in which His glory can be served by a nobleman's advice, prestige, and effort. . . . Moreover, the affairs of France are very near our thoughts, for we have always labored to secure for that kingdom the greatest peace and safety not only from foreign enemies to the kingdom and to religion but also from those within. We also have asked this of God in the most earnest supplication. And we continually pray for it. If the princes of this kingdom had all possessed the same good will and love, there would not have come such a burden of misfortune, and we should not now be so worried. Would that there were not so many individuals, who though not of the same mind as ourselves, were at least not hostile to the interests of the kingdom and the most holy religion! But we pray for them also, that they may leave the wicked and join those who know that France can in no way be secure unless religion is saved. That you are of this number, your virtue and your zeal

for retaining the glory of your ancestors by guarding the Catholic religion do not allow us to doubt. Given at Rome, at Saint Peter's, under the ring of the Fisherman, the first day of May, 1593, the second year of our pontificate. Ant. Bucapadulius [Signature].

[Below] To our beloved son and nobleman, duke of Montmorency, governor of the province of Languedoc.

20. Bibliothèque nationale, *Collection Dupuy*, 62, fol. 20 (copy). [Henry of Montmorency to the pope, August 11, 1593.]

Most Holy Father, in the dispatch which I addressed to Your Holiness on the fifth of July, I informed you that the king had decided to enter the Roman Catholic Church. Now I trust that Your Holiness will appreciate the fact that I feel it necessary from a sense of duty to let you know that His Majesty has demonstrated his sincerity to the satisfaction of everyone. He has been admonished and instructed by many ecclesiastics and learned personages whom he had assembled, and has recognized his error and become a Catholic. Furthermore, with much zeal and devotion he heard Mass in the town of Saint-Denis, near the city of Paris, on Sunday, July 25, with many princes and Catholic lords and a great crowd of subjects, even from the city of Paris, present. I have received news of it from one of my people, who was there and returned only yesterday. This has marvelously rejoiced, consoled, and for-

tified us, all his subjects and Catholic servitors, not only because we believe it will work for the glory of God and the advancement of His Church, but also because of the hope that we have that Your Holiness will find this holy act acceptable, and that from it will result a great and inestimable profit, namely: the repose and tranquillity of this poor and desolated realm and all Christendom. . . . I have had thanks rendered to God, with processions and public prayers throughout all the towns of my government, on account of the good and most satisfactory news. . . . And now, most Holy Father, the restoration of our well-being lies, next to God, in your hands. If you receive this good Catholic and very Christian king of France into your arms and those of the Church, imposing silence upon his subjects, commanding them to lay down their arms and to render to him the obedience which subjects naturally owe to their king, then I am sure neither they nor their partisans will dare to stand in opposition, especially if it may please Your Holiness to use in the matter the power and authority which have been given to you from God. . . . All the French people offer their supplications to you in this, very humbly, with tears in their eyes, kneeling upon the ground, and awaiting their relief from your paternal kindness. I also make a similar prayer, with the same humility, daring to promise myself that you will receive it in good part.

21. Devic and Vaissete, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, XII, 1509–1510. [Extracts from the instructions given by Henry IV to his agent, La Fin, who was to interview the duke of Montmorency in Languedoc, 1593.]

The king is pleased with the constable for carrying on negotiations in His Majesty's behalf at Rome. . . . He is also satisfied with the pope's pastoral letter . . . and with the latter's confidence in Montmorency. . . . The king hopes that His Holiness will also listen to the advice of others, now that Henry IV has joined the Catholic church and is trying to please the Holy Father. . . . However, the enemies of the monarchy may still be able to influence the pope by claiming that the king is not a sincere convert. . . . At any rate Henry believes that the constable . . . should send someone to Rome . . . to aid Nev-ers . . . in maintaining the king's cause, thus blocking the evil designs of his enemies.

22. Henry IV, *Lettres intimes*, 202–203. [Henry IV to Rosny (Sully), March 8, 1594.]

[M. de Villars-Branças held Rouen, Havre, and Haute-Normandie for the League. Henry IV, according to the plan which he describes to Sully in the following letter, was resolved to buy the submission of Villars and of the other leaders of the League, and thus reestablish peace and order in France,—a land exhausted and ruined by

forty years of civil wars. He commissioned his faithful Rosny to negotiate with Villars, who demanded the office of admiral, the governments of Rouen and of Havre, 1,200,000 livres (12 million francs) to pay his debts, 60,000 livres (600,000 francs) pension, and the revenues of six abbeys. Rosny, dismayed because these demands involved huge expenditures, wrote to the king, who, in turn, replied as follows:]

My friend, you are a fool to permit so many delays, to raise numerous difficulties, and to try to practice economy in an affair whose conclusion plays so important a part in my efforts to establish my authority and to relieve my people. Do you not recollect the advice you have given me so many times:—that like a certain duke of Milan,² in his relations with Louis XI at the time of the war called the *Bien public*, I should separate by particular interests all those who were leagued against me for various reasons. This is what I now desire to do. In fact I prefer that it costs me twice as much to negotiate separately with each individual, than to arrive at the same end by means of a general treaty made with a single leader (as you know some people would like me to do), for he could by this means always maintain a party within my state. Therefore, do not try to be respectful to those whose attitude toward us is questionable. Nor be too economical. In fact do not consider the cost, for by paying we

² Francis Sforza.

will obtain things which, if seized by force, would cost us ten times as much. Now I trust in you entirely and love you as a good servant. So do not hesitate to use absolutely and boldly your power which I authorize further by this letter. . . . Above everything else arrange a settlement as soon as possible with Villars. At the same time make sure that no mistakes are made; and send me news of what you do promptly, for I will be constantly in doubt and impatient until I have heard from you. Then I will be a peaceful king, and we will adopt some of the good economies which you have mentioned so often. Indeed you may be assured that, regardless of the risk and the labor involved, I will do everything possible to raise my office and my state to their greatest splendor.

23. Bibliothèque national, *Collection Dupuy*, 62, fol. 102. [Henry of Montmorency to the king, April 4, 1594.]

[Montmorency first called the king's attention to a letter which he had sent him on March 25. In it he had expressed confidence in the settlement of affairs in Provence. But the arrival of Lesdiguières with his troops in that region complicated matters.]

. . . As far as I can conjecture, you have been told that the whole of the said country [Provence] is in rebellion against Épernon. Nevertheless, I have been assured that of the twenty-four districts in the province, eighteen are represented

in the assembly at Riez.³ Thus La Fin,⁴ who is wanting neither in duty nor intelligence . . . is taking a good course in this matter. He wishes first to suspend hostilities. . . . It is not at all probable even that you intend that the troops of Lesdiguières should come to blows with the others, especially with those soldiers I have given Épernon, for Your Majesty has not requested me to order them to return. Nevertheless, Lesdiguières has exceeded his instructions by invading the country two days after La Fin had informed him of your will. . . . He did this regardless of the fact that Épernon is disposed to lay down his arms and that I have given orders to my cavalry, which were in Provence, to retire into Languedoc after the said agreed suspension of hostilities, so that they may rest and make ready for the journey to Your Majesty. Three weeks ago, too, I retired my foot troops. . . . Épernon, displeased at the invasion, . . . will wish to oppose it, appealing to his friends for support. His opponent [Lesdiguières], on the other hand, has become obstinate and will join those who only recently recognized your authority. So these two forces are face to face, both filled with your subjects and servants (at least they call themselves such), and they are on the point of engaging in a great battle, the issue of which, no matter to which side the victory goes,

³ This assembly was called by Épernon.

⁴ The king's agent.

can be only to the prejudice of Your Majesty and the state. On the other hand, the king of Spain and the duke of Savoy will profit by these struggles.

[Montmorency goes on to say that he had learned that the king of Spain was preparing an army in Italy for the invasion of Provence. Because of that menace Montmorency had sent a dispatch in the name of the king by La Fin to Lesdiguières and Épernon ordering them to lay down their arms and withdraw their troops. At the same time he sent to each of the two parties individual letters recalling them to the obedience they owed the king. He also assembled troops to use in case of need.]

A few hours after this dispatch, Lerres, a minister, came to me with letters from Lesdiguières, in which he makes a great show of wishing to obey your orders and to satisfy my requests. I doubt him, however, and believe either that he is making use of Your Majesty's name to further his own interests, or else that he has some special instruction of which I am ignorant. Several parties, noticing his actions, talk about it and make their own exceptions to my orders. In view of the slight attention he pays to my exhortations, I do not know what to say or think, unless there be some secret hidden in this matter which Your Majesty believes me capable of penetrating. I ask you very humbly to do me the honor of clearing it up. . . .

I beg you likewise very humbly to believe that if any evil comes from the situation in Provence, as is to be feared, I shall not be the cause of it, but rather those who refuse to obey my advice or listen to my requests. I am principally grieved that this affair will delay my journey to Your Majesty, and I beg you very humbly to grant that if these people get headstrong and refuse to listen to reason and if this matter takes too long to settle, I may drop everything and come to you . . . and make you see that all these slanders heaped upon me by my enemies and the envious are pure calumnies. Furthermore, I hope to maintain myself in the possession of your favor by the fidelity of my services, so that my enemies will burst with rage and spite and that Your Majesty will see the difference between them and me.

24. Sully, *Mémoires*, II, 343-344. [1594].

. . . it so happened that I met Madame de Guise . . . walking with Henry IV in the Louvre. She was begging and entreating him to accept the humble services of her family, assuring him that they wanted, above everything else, to return to his good graces and to render him complete obedience. . . .

[Henry IV] granted the duke of Guise the government of Provence on condition that he relinquish Champagne. He also gave the nobleman the office of grandmaster of France and all the benefices that had belonged to the cardinal of Guise, saying that they should be restored to the

duke, as the latter's uncle and father had been forcibly deprived of them.

25. Henry IV, *Lettres missives*, IV, 430-431.

[Henry IV to the constable, the duke of Montmorency, October 23, 1595.]

. . . I appreciate, my cousin, the devotion shown by you and members of my council who have assisted you in the Épernon affair. Like you, I consider Épernon's disobedience inexcusable. The offers which you made him, according to my instructions, were sufficiently advantageous to satisfy him. In fact, if he had possessed the slightest affection and goodwill toward his king and country he would have been glad to do the right thing. You noticed his unfriendly attitude. I expected it. Remember what I told you concerning his acts in the past? Your experience with him during the last assembly confirms me in my opinion. The evidence you gave me of his disobedience, pleases me. We cannot be too lenient with him. You have told him what he should do. You have begged him to do the right thing and even threatened to punish him if he failed to accept your advice. Yet you have not been able to get him to change his course. On the contrary he has made new demands and created new difficulties. Eh! He treats my authority with contempt. . . . Well, I have decided to punish him severely and thus obtain his obedience by force. . . . Yet, my cousin, if you still believe that you . . . can persuade him to obey me, approach him for the last

time. But don't offer him any more than I stipulated in my instructions. . . . Also . . . see that my cousin, the duke of Guise, is not delayed in carrying out my orders. You will tell him what you have done and intend to do in the Épernon affair. And I hope that you will send Guise the order depriving Épernon of his authority [in Provence] . . . as soon as possible, providing you fail to receive the necessary promises from Épernon. I trust in your judgment in this matter, knowing that you will look out for my interests and advise the duke of Guise as to his course of action.

26. Henry IV, *Lettres missives*, IV, 436. [Henry IV to the constable, the duke of Montmorency, October 28, 1595.]

. . . I beg you, my cousin, to send my nephew⁵ the revocation of the duke of Épernon's authority. Also advise the former as to his duties in my service. I am willing to receive the duke of Épernon and help him, if he will be loyal to me. But, as I have stated in other letters, I shall leave the question of his dismissal to your judgment.

27. Henry IV, *Lettres missives*, IV, 438-439. [Henry IV to the constable, the duke of Montmorency, October 29, 1595.]

My cousin, I have written you . . . concerning my affairs in Provence. . . . I trust that, in accordance with the command I gave my estimable

⁵ The duke of Guise.

nephew, the duke of Guise, and in compliance with my written instructions, you have sent Guise the order revoking the authority of the duke of Épernon. If you have not done this, I want you to have Bigot take him the revocation. I have ordered my agent to go directly to you, to find out what you know about Épernon's plans, and what you think my nephew should do to carry out my commands. In fact, I ask you, my cousin, to have Bigot convey your prudent advice [to Guise] . . . and meanwhile don't fail to let the duke of Épernon know that he will always find me ready to receive him whenever he is willing to do his duty.

28. Henry IV, *Lettres intimes*, 240-241.

[Henry IV to the constable of France, the duke of Montmorency, February 29, 1596.]

[Provence, ruled by the duke of Épernon, was yielding little by little to the duke of Guise, to whom the king had given its government. Marseilles alone was controlled by the League. There the consul Casaux and the provost Louis d'Aix, ardent Leaguers, supported by a fanatical populace, always advocates of disorder, oppressed the citizens. These leaders called upon . . . Philip II for aid. He sent them ships and soldiers. Finally the loyal population of Marseilles decided to shake off this shameful yoke and on February 17 opened the gates to the duke of

Guise. The submission of Marseilles' entailed that of the duke of Épernon. As a result Henry IV could say: "Now I am king."]

My compère, yesterday evening Lamanon (or d'Allamanon, one of the officers of the duke of Guise) whom my nephew, the duke of Guise, dispatched to me after the capture of Marseilles, arrived. . . . He brought good news. . . .⁶ Casaux and his son were killed upon the spot, and the provost was taken prisoner. . . . Sixty Spaniards lost their lives, and the two galleys of Casaux and of the provost were captured. The Spaniards, bringing reinforcements, were on the isles. I beg you to return thanks to Heaven for these glad tidings.

29. Sully, *Mémoires*, III, 155-156. [1598.]

During my stay of a month or six weeks at Rennes, the king completed his treaty with M. de Mercure, and then went to Nantes. Here all the Huguenot deputies and some of the leading seigneurs, professing that religion, presented themselves and asked the monarch to enact a permanent edict under which they might live [enjoy religious liberty], instead of the truce which had been granted them.

Lord Cecil and Admiral Justin de Nassau, ambassadors of England and Holland, respectively, also arrived, intending to prevent the king from concluding a peace with Spain. The English

⁶ The Spanish fleet was anchored near the islands of Rato-neau and of Pomègue, in front of the harbor of Marseilles.

ambassador offered Henry six thousand infantrymen and five hundred English cavalry, provided he continue the war; while the Dutch diplomat promised four thousand infantrymen. They also agreed to help him recapture Calais and Ardres by furnishing artillery, provisions, munitions, and warships. But many reasons . . . prevented the king from accepting these offers and influenced him to arrange the peace of Vervins with Spain.

30. Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens*, V, 544 sqq. [Extracts from the Edict of Nantes, 1598.] *Henry, by the grace of God king of France and of Navarre, . . . greetings:*

Among the infinite benefits which it has pleased God to heap upon us, the most signal and precious is his granting us the strength and ability to withstand the fearful disorders and troubles which prevailed on our advent in this kingdom. The realm was so torn by innumerable factions and sects that the most legitimate of all the parties was fewest in numbers. God has given us strength to stand out against this storm; we have finally surmounted the waves and made our port of safety,—peace for our state. For which his be the glory all in all, and ours a free recognition of his grace in making use of our instrumentality in the good work. . . . We implore and await from the Divine Goodness the same protection and favor which he has ever granted to this kingdom from the beginning. . . .

We have, by this perpetual and irrevocable edict, established and proclaimed and do establish and proclaim:

I. First, that the memory of everything done by one party or the other between March, 1585, and our accession to the crown, and during all the preceding period of troubles, remain obliterated and forgotten.

III. We ordain that the Catholic Apostolic and Roman religion shall be restored and reestablished in all places and localities of this our kingdom and countries subject to our sway, where the exercise of the same has been interrupted, in order that it may be peaceably and freely exercised, without any trouble or hindrance; forbidding all persons, of whatsoever estate, quality, or condition, from troubling, molesting, or disturbing ecclesiastics in the celebration of divine service, in the enjoyment or collection of tithes, fruits, or revenues of their benefices, and all other rights and dues belonging to them; and that all those who during the troubles have taken possession of churches, houses, goods or revenues, belonging to the said ecclesiastics, shall surrender to them entire possession and peaceable enjoyment of such rights, liberties, and sureties as they had before they were deprived of them.

VI. And in order to leave no occasion for troubles or differences between our subjects, we have permitted, and herewith permit, those of the

said religion called Reformed⁷ to live and abide in all the cities and places of this our kingdom and countries of our sway, without being annoyed, molested, or compelled to do anything in the matter of religion contrary to their consciences, . . . upon condition that they comport themselves in other respects according to that which is contained in this edict.

VII. All lords, gentlemen, and other persons making profession of the said religion called Reformed, and holding the right of high justice [or a certain feudal tenure], may exercise the said religion in their houses.

IX. We also permit those of the said religion to make and continue the exercise of the same in all villages and places of our dominion where it was established by them and publicly enjoyed several and divers times in the year 1597, up to the end of the month of August, notwithstanding all decrees and judgments to the contrary.

XIII. We forbid to all those of the said religion its exercise, either in respect to ministry, regulation, discipline, or the public instruction of children, or otherwise, in this our kingdom and lands of our dominion, otherwise than in the places permitted and granted by the present edict.

XIV. It is forbidden as well to perform any function of the said religion in our court or ret-

⁷ The official designation for Protestantism in France.

inue, or in our lands and territories beyond the mountains, or in our city of Paris, or within five leagues of the said city.

XVIII. We also forbid all our subjects, of whatever quality and condition, from carrying off by force or persuasion, against the will of their parents, the children of the said religion, in order to cause them to be baptized or confirmed in the Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church; and the same is forbidden to those of the said religion called Reformed, upon penalty of being punished with especial severity.

XXI. Books concerning the said religion called Reformed may not be printed and publicly sold, except in cities and places where the public exercise of the said religion is permitted.

XXII. We ordain that there shall be no difference or distinction made in respect to the said religion, in receiving pupils to be instructed in universities, colleges, and schools; or in receiving the sick and poor into hospitals, retreats, and public charities.

XXIII. Those of the said religion called Reformed shall be obliged to respect the laws of the Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church, recognized in this our kingdom, for the consummation of marriages contracted, or to be contracted, as regards the degrees of consanguinity and kinship.

31. Sully, *Mémoires*, V, 64-69. [1603.]

In 1603 several events occurred which should not be omitted in a general history of France. But

in these *Mémoires* I shall only relate how the king, wishing to establish the mulberry tree and the manufacture of silk and other goods hitherto made in foreign countries, planned to import workmen . . . at great expense, and to construct large buildings for them to live in. I tried to discourage him, but he insisted, saying, . . . "I do not know why you oppose my plans and my will to embellish and enrich my kingdom and to eradicate unemployment."

"Sir," I replied, "I do not wish to oppose your plan, nor consider the expense, for I appreciate the obstacles, the hard work, and the dangers you have encountered during your entire life. Now that a state of peace exists and times are better it is reasonable that you also have some pleasure. Of course if the expense were excessive I would remonstrate with you; but merely because this policy does not accord with the plan you had me propose to the king of England. Even then I would obey you."

"I cannot, however, see how you can hope to embellish and enrich France by these measures. And if Your Majesty is willing to listen to my reasons, appreciating, as I do, your alert mind and your sound judgment, I feel certain that you will agree with me."

"Yes, I consent," said the king, "I shall be glad to hear your views on the matter. But I wish that you listen to me afterwards, for I am sure that my ideas are better than yours."

"If I had realized, sire, that you had been greatly influenced by the opinions of the Bourgs and the Cumans,"⁸ I said, "I would not have mentioned mine, for after all, my ideas will never express anything but your will. Yet in giving my reasons, since Your Majesty is good enough to hear me, I shall say things which at some future time you may wish you had considered. In the first place, Your Majesty should realize that God, in creating various climates, regions, and countries, purposely planned diversity in resources, crops, and manufactures. Now by means of trade and commerce nations exchange things they have in abundance for commodities they lack. Thus states through associations and intercourse, regardless of distance apart, contribute to the development of civilization. . . . In the next place, France does not possess the climate, location, elevation of the sun, temperature of the air, quality of the soil, nor people of the requisite temperament, to insure the success of Your Majesty's schemes. In the third place, the spring season is too cold, damp, and late to enable the silk worm to hatch. . . . And in the fourth place, the employment of your subjects in this sedentary work will make them unaccustomed to hard labor,—and I have often heard Your Majesty say that toilers make the best soldiers. . . . Further, France has more productive territory than any other country in the world except Egypt. This land is capable of rais-

⁸ A proverbial expression the meaning of which is unknown.

ing grains, vegetables, wines, dyes, oils, ciders, salts, flax, hemp, wool, linen, cloth, sheep, hogs, and mules. The sale of these products is alone responsible for the importation of gold and silver. Thus they are worth more to France than all the silks and manufactures thriving in Sicily, Spain, or Italy. Instead of the production of these luxuries employing your people and enriching your state they will make your subjects extravagant. And excessive spending, remember, has ruined kingdoms and republics. In fact, loyal men, and brave and industrious soldiers will do more for you than court fops and cities adorned with gold and purple. It is claimed that the manufacture of luxuries will stop the exportation of gold and silver. But a better way to accomplish this aim would be to prohibit all lavishness by regulating the clothes, furnishings, buildings, plants, gardens, jewels, silver plate, horses, coaches, equipage, attendants, gildings, paintings, marriages of children, purchase of offices, beasts, banquets, and perfumes, of everyone, regardless of rank. This was successfully done in the reigns of Louis XI, Charles VIII, and Louis XII. And, it is interesting to note, the middle class then as now were the chief wasters. . . . Above all, when one considers the vast amount of gold and silver spent for luxuries, it certainly does not seem wise to encourage that trade by manufacturing such articles here."

"So these are your reasons," the king said,

"Well, mine are better. I wish to make certain experiments that have been proposed to me. Further, I would rather fight the king of Spain in three pitched battles than to oppose these lawyers, bankers, clerks, and the other townspeople you intend to regulate. Especially do I fear their wives, for these laws would cause all of them to descend upon me. No, I prefer to consider your plan next year."

"Very well, sir," I said, "I will not discuss it further, but in time you will learn that France is not the place to manufacture baubles. As to the building you wish to construct . . . for your workers, I would like to suggest that you select another place for it, as I have plans of erecting there one of the most magnificent structures in Paris, perhaps in Europe. And it will cost you nothing. I am sure that when the three sides of the edifice have been built and you see them you will, in order to construct the fourth side, tear down the partly built home for workmen."

"Well," said the king, "later on we will know better what to do."

Then Zamet entered and announced that the king's dinner awaited him at home. Henry left. 32. Sully, *Mémoires*, V, 69-70. [1603.]

[In 1603] an expedition under the command of the Sieur de Monts was sent [by the king] to establish a colony in Canada. I opposed this undertaking because, in my opinion, no great wealth can be obtained in those countries of the

New World situated above the fortieth degree of latitude.

33. Sully, *Mémoires*, IX, 4-5. [Economic policies of Henry IV as outlined by Sully.]

To establish an efficient administrative system which should provide for the honest collection of revenues, sufficient to cover the necessary expenses of the state, and at the same time not so heavy as to overburden the people.

To provide good legislation which should stimulate the development of trade, favor workers and manufacturers, and encourage agriculture and stock raising, and enable all these occupations to develop without fear of being subjected to additional taxes, . . . or to the ravages brought about by internal disorders.

34. Sully, *The Great Design of Henry IV*, 1-36. [Extracts from.]

As this part of these Memoirs will be entirely taken up with an account of the great design of Henry IV., or the political scheme by which he proposed to govern, not only France, but all Europe, it may not be improper to begin it with some more general reflections on this monarchy. . . .

When I observed that the extent of France is not now so considerable as it was in the time of Charlemagne, my intention, most certainly, was not that this diminution should be considered as a misfortune. In an age when we feel the sad effects of having had ambitious princes from time to time for our kings, were all to concur in

flattering this fatal ambition it would be the cause of still greater evils; and it may be generally observed that the larger the extent of kingdoms, the more they are subject to great revolutions and misfortunes. The basis of the tranquillity of our own, in particular, depends upon preserving it within its present limits. A climate, laws, manners, and language, different from our own; seas, and chains of mountains almost inaccessible, are all so many barriers which we may consider as fixed even by nature. Besides, what is it that France wants? Will she not always be the richest and most powerful kingdom in Europe? It must be granted. All, therefore, which the French have to wish or desire is, that Heaven may grant them pious, good, and wise kings; and that these kings may employ their power in preserving the peace of Europe; for no other enterprise can, truly, be to them either profitable or successful.

And this explains to us the nature of the design which Henry IV. was on the point of putting in execution when it pleased God to take him to himself, too soon by some years for the happiness of the world. From hence likewise we may perceive the motives for his pursuing a conduct so opposite to anything that had hitherto been undertaken by crowned heads; and here we may behold what it was that acquired him the title of "great." His designs were not inspired by a mean and despicable ambition, nor guided by base and partial interests: to render France happy forever was

his desire; and as she cannot perfectly enjoy this felicity unless all Europe likewise partakes of it, so it was the happiness of Europe in general which he laboured to procure, and this in a manner so solid and durable that nothing should afterwards be able to shake its foundations. . . .

I remember the first time the king spoke to me of a political system by which all Europe might be regulated and governed as one great family, I scarcely paid any attention to what he said, imagining that he meant no more by it than merely to divert himself, or perhaps to show that his thoughts on political subjects were greater, and penetrated deeper, than most others; my reply was a mixture of pleasantry and compliment. Henry said no more at that time. He often confessed to me afterwards that he had long concealed from me what he meditated on this subject, from a principle of shame, which many labour under, lest they should disclose designs which might appear ridiculous or impossible. I was astonished when, some time after, he renewed our conversation on this head, and continued from year to year to entertain me with new regulations and new improvements in his scheme. . . .

The constant attention this prince paid to all affairs transacted around him, from an effect of those singularly unhappy circumstances, by which, in almost every instant of his life, he found himself embarrassed, had been the cause of his

forming this design, even from the time when, being called to the crown by the death of Henry III., he considered the humbling of the house of Austria as absolutely necessary for his security; yet, if he was not beholden to Elizabeth⁹ for his thought of the design, it is, however, certain that this great queen had herself conceived it long before, as a means to revenge Europe for the attempts of its common enemy. The troubles in which all the following years were engaged, the war which succeeded in 1595, and that against Savoy after the peace of Vervins, forced Henry into difficulties which obliged him to lay aside all thoughts of other affairs; and it was not till after his marriage, and the firm reestablishment of peace, that he renewed his thoughts upon his first design, to execute which appeared then more impossible, or at least more improbable, than ever.

He nevertheless communicated it by letters to Elizabeth, and this was what inspired them with so strong an inclination to confer together in 1601, when this princess came to Dover, and Henry to Calais. What the ceremony of an interview would not have permitted them to do, I at last began by the voyage which I had made to this princess. I found her deeply engaged in the means by which this great design might be successfully executed; and, notwithstanding the difficulties which she apprehended in its two principal points, namely, the agreement of religions and the equality of the

⁹ Queen Elizabeth of England.

powers, she did not appear to me at all to doubt of its success, which she chiefly expected, for a reason the justness of which I have since been well convinced of; and this was, that, as the plan was really only contrary to the design of some princes, whose ambitious views were sufficiently known to Europe, this difficulty, from which the necessity of the design more evidently appeared, would rather promote than retard its success. She further said, that its execution by any other means than that of arms, would be very desirable, as this had always something odious in it: but she confessed that indeed it would be hardly possible to begin it any other wise. A very great number of the articles, conditions, and different dispositions are due to this queen, and sufficiently show, that in respect of wisdom, penetration, and all the other perfections of the mind, she was not inferior to any king the most truly deserving of that title.

It must indeed be considered as a very great misfortune that Henry could not at this time second the intentions of the Queen of England, who wished to have the design put in immediate execution; but when he thus laid the foundation of the edifice, he scarcely hoped to see the time when the finishing hand would be put to it. The recovery of his own kingdom from the various maladies by which it was afflicted was a work of several years, and unhappily he had himself seen forty-eight when he began it; he pursued it, never-

theless, with the greatest vigour. The edict of Nantes had been published with this view, and every other means was used which might gain the respect and confidence of the princes of Europe. Henry and I, at the same time, applied ourselves with indefatigable labour to regulate the interior affairs of the kingdom. We considered the death of the King of Spain as the most favourable event that could happen for our design: but it received so violent a shock by the death of Elizabeth, as had like to have made us abandon all our hopes. Henry had no expectation that the powers of the north, nor King James, the successor of Elizabeth (when he was acquainted with his character), would any of them so readily consent to support him in his design as this princess had done. However, the new allies which he daily gained in Germany, and even in Italy, consoled him a little for the loss of Elizabeth. The truce between Spain and the Low Countries may also be numbered among incidents favourable to it.

Yet, if we consider all the obstacles which afterwards arose in his own kingdom, from the Protestants, the Catholics, the clergy, nay even from his own council, it will appear as if all things conspired against it. Will it be believed that Henry could not find in his whole council one person, besides myself, to whom he could, without danger, disclose the whole of his designs? and that the respect due to him could scarcely restrain those who appeared most devoted to his service from

treating as wild and extravagant chimeras what he had entrusted to them with the greatest circumspection. But nothing discouraged him: he was an abler politician and a better judge than all his council, and all his kingdom; and when he perceived that, notwithstanding all these obstacles, affairs began, both at home and abroad, to appear in a favourable situation, he then considered the success as infallible.

Nor will this his judgment, when thoroughly considered, be found so presumptuous as, from a slight examination, it may appear to some. For what did he hereby require of Europe? Nothing more than that it should promote the means by which he proposed to fix it in the position, towards which, by his efforts, it had for some time tended. These means he rendered so easy of execution that it would scarcely require what many of the princes of Europe would voluntarily sacrifice for advantages much less real, less certain, and less durable. What they would gain by it, besides the inestimable benefits arising from peace, would greatly exceed all the expenses they would be at. What reason then could any of them have to oppose it? And if they did not oppose it, how could the house of Austria support itself against powers in whom the desire and pleasure of depriving it of that strength which it had used only to oppress them would have raised against it as many open as it had secret enemies—that is, the whole of Europe? Nor would these princes have any reason

to be jealous of the restorer of their liberty; for he was so far from seeking to reimburse himself for all the expenses which his generosity would hereby engage him in, that his intention was to relinquish voluntarily and for ever all power of augmenting his dominions; not only by conquest, but by every other just and lawful means. By this he would have discovered the secret of convincing all his neighbours that his whole design was to save both himself and them those immense sums which the maintenance of so many thousand soldiers, so many fortified places, and so many military expenses require; to free them for ever from the fear of those bloody catastrophes so common in Europe; to procure them an uninterrupted repose; and finally, to unite them all in an indissoluble bond of security and friendship, after which they might live together like brethren, and reciprocally visit like good neighbours, without the trouble of ceremony, and without the expense of a train of attendants, which princes use at best only for ostentation, and frequently to conceal their misery. Does it not indeed reflect shame and reproach on a people who affect to be so polished and refined in their manners, that all their pretended wisdom has not yet, I will not say procured them tranquillity, but only guarded them from those barbarities which they detest in nations the most savage and uncultivated? And to destroy these pernicious seeds of confusion and disorder, and to prevent the barbarities of which they are

the cause, could any scheme have been more happily and perfectly contrived than that of Henry the Great? . . .

To succeed in the execution of this, which will not appear difficult, if we suppose that all Christian princes unanimously concurred in it, it would only be necessary for each of them to contribute, in proportion to their several abilities, towards the support of the forces, and all the other incidental expenses, which the success of such an enterprise might require. These respective quotas were to have been determined by a general council, of which we shall speak hereafter. The following is what Henry the Great had himself conceived on this head. The pope, for this expedition, should furnish eight thousand foot, twelve hundred horse, ten cannons, and ten galleys; the emperor and the circles of Germany, sixty thousand foot, twenty thousand horse, five large cannons, and ten galleys or other vessels; the King of France twenty thousand foot, four thousand horse, twenty cannons, and ten ships or galleys; Spain, Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and Poland, the like number with France, observing only, that these powers should together supply what belonged to the sea service in the manner most suitable to their respective conveniences and abilities therein; the King of Bohemia five thousand foot, fifteen hundred horse, and five cannons; the King of Hungary twelve thousand foot, five thousand horse, twenty cannons, and six ships; the Duke of Savoy,

or King of Lombardy, eight thousand foot, fifteen hundred horse, eight cannons, and six galleys; the republic of Venice ten thousand foot, twelve hundred horse, ten cannons, and twenty-five galleys; the republic of the Swiss cantons fifteen thousand foot, five thousand horse, and twelve cannons; the republic of Holland twelve thousand foot, twelve hundred horse, twelve cannons, and twelve ships; the Italian republics ten thousand foot, twelve hundred horse, ten cannons, and eight galleys; the whole together amounting to about two hundred and seventy thousand foot, fifty thousand horse, two hundred cannons, and one hundred and twenty ships or galleys, equipped and maintained at the expense of all those powers, each contributing according to his particular proportion.

This armament of the princes and states of Europe appears so inconsiderable and so little burdensome, when compared with the forces which they usually keep on foot to awe their neighbours, or perhaps their own subjects, that were it to have subsisted, even perpetually, it would not have occasioned any inconvenience, and would have been an excellent military academy: but, besides that the enterprises for which it was destined would not always have continued, the number and expense of it might have been diminished in proportion to the necessities, which would always have been the same. Though I am persuaded such an armament would have been so highly approved

of by all these princes, that, after they had conquered with it whatever they would not suffer any stranger should share with them in Europe, they would have sought to join to it such parts of Asia as were most commodiously situated, and particularly the whole coast of Africa, which is too near to our own territories for us not to be frequently incommoded by it. The only precaution to be observed in regard to these additional countries would have been to form them into new kingdoms, declare them united with the rest of the Christian powers, and bestow them on different princes, carefully observing to exclude those who before bore rank among the sovereigns of Europe.

That part of the design which may be considered as purely political, turned almost entirely on a first preliminary, which, I think, would not have met with more difficulty than the preceding article. This was to divest the house of Austria of the empire, and of all the possessions in Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries: in a word, to reduce it to the sole kingdom of Spain, bounded by the Ocean, the Mediterranean, and the Pyrenean mountains. But that it might, nevertheless, be equally powerful with the other sovereignties of Europe, it should have Sardinia, Majorca, Minorca, and the other islands on its own coasts; the Canaries, the Azores, and Cape Verde, with its possessions in Africa; Mexico, and the American islands which belong to it, countries which

alone might suffice to found great kingdoms; finally, the Philippines, Goa, the Moluccas, and its other possessions in Asia.

From hence a method seems to present itself, by which the house of Austria might be indemnified for what it would be deprived of in Europe, which is to increase its dominions in the three other parts of the world, by assisting it to obtain, and by declaring it the sole proprietor, both of what we do know, and what we may hereafter discover in those parts. We may suppose that on this occasion it would not have been necessary to use force to bring this house to concur in such a design; and, indeed, even on this supposition, it was not the prince of this house reigning in Spain to whom these parts of the world were to be subjected, but to different princes of the same, or of different branches, who, in acknowledgment of their possessions, should only have rendered homage to the crown of Spain, or, at most, a tribute, as due to the original conquerors. This house, which is so very desirous of being the most powerful in the world, might hereby have continued to flatter itself with so pleasing a pre-eminence, without the other powers being endangered by its pretended grandeur.

The steps taken by the house of Austria to arrive at universal monarchy, which evidently appears from the whole conduct of Charles V. and his son, have rendered this severity as just as it is necessary; and I will venture to say that this

house would not have had any reasonable cause to complain of it. It is true it would be deprived of the empire; but when impartially considered, it will appear that all the other princes of Germany, and even of Europe, have an equal right to it. . . .

As to the possessions of the house of Austria in Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries, of which it was to be deprived, not to mention here how much it is indebted for them to a tyrannical usurpation, it would, after all, be only depriving it of territories which it keeps at so prodigious an expense (I speak in particular of Italy and the Low Countries), as all its treasures of the Indies have not been able to defray: and besides, by investing it with the exclusive privilege above mentioned, of gaining new establishments, and appropriating to its own use the mines and treasures of the three other parts of the world, it would be abundantly indemnified; for these new acquisitions would be at least as considerable, and undoubtedly far more rich, than those. But what is here proposed must not be understood as if the other nations of Europe were excluded from all commerce to those countries; on the contrary, it should be free and open to every one, and the house of Austria, instead of considering this stipulation, which is of the greatest consequence, as an infringement of its privileges, would rather have reason to regard it as a further advantage.

From a further examination and consideration

of these dispositions, I do not doubt but the house of Austria would have accepted the proposed conditions without being forced to it. But, supposing the contrary, what would a resistance have signified? The promise made to all the princes of Europe, of enriching themselves by the territories of which this house was to be divested, would deprive it of all hopes of assistance from any of them.

Upon the whole, then, it appears that all parties would have been gainers by it, and this was what assured Henry the Great of the success of his design: the empire would again become a dignity to which all princes, but particularly those of Germany, might aspire: and this dignity would be so much the more desirable, though, according to its original institution, no revenues would be annexed to it, as the emperor would be declared the first and chief magistrate of the whole Christian republic; and as we may suppose this honour would afterwards be conferred only on the most worthy, all his privileges in this respect, instead of being diminished, would be enlarged, his authority over the Belgic and Helvetic republics would be more considerable, and upon every new election they would be obliged to render him a respectful homage. The electors would still continue to enjoy the right of electing the emperor, as well as of nominating the King of the Romans, with this restriction only,—that the election should not be made twice successively out of the

same family. The first to have been elected in this manner was the Elector of Bavaria, who was also, in consequence of the partition, to have had those territories possessed by the house of Austria which joined to his own on the side of Italy.

The rest of these territories were to have been divided and equally distributed by the Kings of France, England, Denmark, and Sweden, among the Venetians, the Grisons, the Duke of Würtemberg, and the Marquis of Baden, Anspach, and Dourlach. Bohemia was to have been constituted an elective kingdom, by annexing it to Moravia, Silesia, and Lusatia. Hungary was also to have been an elective kingdom, and the pope, the Emperor, the Kings of France, England, Denmark, Sweden, and Lombardy, were to have had the right of nomination to it; and because this kingdom may be considered as the barrier of Christendom against the infidels, it was to have been rendered the most powerful and able to resist them; and this was to have been done by immediately adding to it the Archduchy of Austria, Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, and by afterwards incorporating with it whatever might be acquired in Transylvania, Bosnia, Sclavonia, and Croatia. The same electors were to have obliged themselves, by oath, to assist it upon all occasions; and they were to have been particularly careful never to grant their suffrages from partiality, artifice, or intrigue, but always to confer the dignity on a prince who, by his great qualifications, par-

ticularly for war, should be generally acknowledged as most proper. Poland being, from its nearness to Turkey, Muscovy, and Tartary, in the same situation with Hungary, was also to have been an elective kingdom, by the same eight potentates, and its power was to have been augmented, by annexing to it what ever should be conquered from the infidels adjoining to its own frontiers, and by determining in its favour those disputes which it had with all its other neighbours. Switzerland, when augmented by Franche-Comté, Alsace, the Tyrol, and other territories, was to have been united into a sovereign republic, governed by council or senate, of which the emperor, the princes of Germany, and the Venetians were to have been umpires.

The changes to be made in Italy were, that the pope should be declared a secular prince, and bear rank among the monarchs of Europe, and under this title should possess Naples, Apulia, Calabria, and all their dependencies, which should be indissolubly united to St. Peter's patrimony; but in case the holy father had opposed this, which, indeed, could scarcely have been supposed, the disposition must then have been changed, and the kingdom of Naples would have been divided and disposed of as the electoral kings should have determined. Sicily was to have been ceded to the republic of Venice, by letters from the same eight principal potentates, upon condition that it should render homage for it to every pope who should

bear the title of Immediate Chief of the whole Italian Republic, otherwise, for this reason, called The Republic of the Church. The other members of this republic were to have been Genoa, Florence, Mantua, Modena, Parma, and Lucca, without any alterations in their government; Bologna and Ferrara were to have been made free cities; and all these governments were every twenty years to have rendered homage to the pope their chief, by the gift of a crucifix of the value of ten thousand crowns.

Of the three great republics of Europe it appears, upon the first glance, that this would have been the most brilliant and the richest. Nevertheless, it would not have been so, for what belonged to the Duke of Savoy was not comprised herein. His territories were to have been constituted one of the great monarchies of Europe, hereditary to males and females, and to have borne the title of the kingdom of Lombardy, wherein, beside the territory so called, the Milanese and Montferrat would also have been comprised; and the Duke of Mantua, in exchange for these, was to have the Duchy of Cremona. An authentic testimony of the institution would have been given by the pope, the emperor, and the other sovereigns of the Christian republic.

Among all these different dismemberings we may observe that France received nothing for itself but the glory of distributing them with equity. Henry had declared this to be his intention

long before. He even sometimes said, with equal moderation and good sense, that were these dispositions once firmly established, he would have voluntarily consented to have the extent of France determined by a majority of suffrages. Nevertheless, as the districts of Artois, Hainault, Cambray, Cambresis, Tournay, Namur, and Luxembourg might more suitably be annexed to France than to any other nation, they were to have been ceded to Henry, but to have been divided into ten distinct governments, and bestowed on so many French princes or lords, all of them bearing rank as sovereigns.

In regard to England it was precisely the same: this was a determined point between Elizabeth and Henry, the two princes who were authors of the scheme, probably from an observation made by this queen, that the Britannic Isles, in all the different states through which they had passed, whether under one or several monarchs, elective or hereditary, as well in the male as female line, and in all the variations of their laws and policy, had never experienced any great disappointments or misfortunes except when their sovereigns had meddled in affairs out of their little continent. It seems, indeed, as if they were concentrated in it even by nature, and their happiness appears to depend entirely on themselves, without having any concerns with their neighbours, provided that they seek only to maintain peace in the three nations subject to them, by governing each according

to its own laws and customs. To render everything equal between France and England, Brabant from the Duchy of Limbourg, the jurisdiction of Malines, and the other dependencies on Flemish Flanders, Gallican or imperial, were to have been formed into eight sovereign fiefs, to be given to so many princes or lords of this nation.

These two parts excepted, all the rest of the seventeen United Provinces, whether belonging to Spain or not, were to have been erected into a free and independent state, under the title of the Belgic republic, though there was one other fief to be formed from them, bearing the title of a principality, to be granted to the Prince of Orange; also some other inconsiderable indemnities for three or four other persons. The succession of Cleves was to have been divided among those princes whom the emperor would have deprived of it, as the means of gratifying them at the expense of the house of Austria, as well as some other princes of the same district, to whom the imperial towns situated therein would have been granted. Even Sweden and Denmark, though they were to be considered as under the influence of the same law which England and France had imposed on themselves, would, by this distribution, have enlarged their territories, and acquired other considerable advantages. An end would have been put to the perpetual troubles which agitated these two kingdoms; and this, I think, would have been rendering them no inconsider-

able service. All these cessions, exchanges, and transpositions towards the north of Germany were to have been determined by the Kings of France, England, and Lombardy, and the republic of Venice.

And now, perhaps, the purport of the design may be perceived, which was to divide Europe equally among a certain number of powers, in such a manner that none of them might have cause either of envy or fear from the possessions or power of the others. The number of them was reduced to fifteen, and they were of three kinds: six great hereditary monarchies, five elective monarchies, and four sovereign republics. The six hereditary monarchies were France, Spain, England or Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and Lombardy; the five elective monarchies were the Empire, the Papacy or Pontificate, Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia; the four republics were the Venetian, the Italian—or what, from its dukes, may be called the Ducal—the Swiss, Helvetic, or Confederate, and the Belgic, or Provincial republic.

The laws and ordinances proper to cement a union between all these princes, and to maintain that harmony which should be once established among them, the reciprocal oaths and engagements in regard both to religion and policy, the mutual assurances in respect to the freedom of commerce, and the measures to be taken to make all these partitions with equity and to the general content and satisfaction of the parties; all these

matters are to be understood, nor is it necessary to say anything of the precaution taken by Henry in regard to them. The most that could have happened would have been some trifling difficulties, which would easily have been obviated in the general council, representing all the states of Europe, the establishment of which was certainly the happiest invention that could have been conceived to prevent those innovations which time often introduces in the wisest and most useful institutions.

The model of this general council of Europe had been formed on that of the ancient Amphyc-tions of Greece, with such alterations only as rendered it suitable to our customs, climate, and policy. It consisted of a certain number of commissioners, ministers, or plenipotentiaries from all the governments of the Christian republic, who were to be constantly assembled as a senate, to deliberate on any affairs which might occur, to discuss the different interests, pacify the quarrels, clear up and determine all the civil, political, and religious affairs of Europe, whether within itself or with its neighbours. The form and manner of proceeding in the senate would have been more particularly determined by the suffrages of the senate itself. Henry was of opinion that it should be composed of four commissioners from each of the following potentates: the Emperor, the Pope, the Kings of France, Spain, England, Denmark, Sweden, Lombardy, Poland, and the republic of Venice; and of two only from the other republics

and inferior powers, which altogether would have composed a senate of about sixty-six persons, who should have been re-chosen every three years.

In regard to the place of meeting, it remained to be determined whether it would be better for the council to be fixed or ambulatory, divided into three, or united in one. If it were divided into three, each containing twenty-two magistrates, then each of them must have been fixed in such a centre as should appear to be most commodious, as Paris or Bourges for one, and somewhere about Trente and Cracovia for the two others. If it were judged more expedient not to divide their assembly, whether fixed or ambulatory, it must have been nearly in the centre of Europe, and would consequently have been fixed in some one of the fourteen cities following: Metz, Luxembourg, Nancy, Cologne, Mayence, Treves, Frankfort, Wirtzburg, Heidelberg, Spire, Worms, Strasbourg, Basle, or Besançon.

Besides this general council it would, perhaps, have been proper to have constituted some others of an inferior degree, for the particular convenience of different districts. For example, were six such created, they might have been placed at Dantzic, Nuremberg, Vienna, Bologna, Constance, and the last wherever it should be judged most convenient for the kingdoms of France, Spain, England, and the Belgic republic. But whatever the number or form of these particular councils might have been, it would have been ab-

solutely necessary that they should be subordinate, and recur, by appeal, to the great general council, whose decisions, when considered as proceeding from the united authority of all the sovereigns, pronounced in a manner equally free and absolute, must have been regarded as so many final and irrevocable decrees.

SUGGESTED EXERCISES

1. From the evidence in this study write as complete an account as you can of the organization, the ideas, and the achievements of the Politique party.

2. From the extracts of the speeches of Henry of Montmorency-Damville write out as full a statement as you can of his views. On the basis of other references relate his achievements. Follow this with a criticism.

3. In a carefully documented paper show how Henry IV overcame the opposition of powerful French noblemen.

4. Trace the relationship existing between the Catholic League, led by the Guises, and the French government during the reigns of Henry III and Henry IV.

5. Prepare an essay, giving footnote references, on the following subject: "Henry IV, a Politique King."

6. Write a criticism of Mornay's and Sully's economic policies.

7. Write a detailed narrative of the events of Part I of the sources (*The Monarchy is threatened*), giving full footnote references.

8. Summarize the events of Part I of the

sources as an introduction without footnotes, and write a detailed narrative of the events of Part II (*The Monarchy is saved*), giving full footnote references.

9. Write a summary narrative of the events of Part I and Part II of the sources, without giving footnote references.

10. Prepare an essay bringing out as fully as you can the significance in French history of the absolutism established by Henry IV.

11. Write an essay, comparing the "Great Design" with the League of Nations.

12. Make out ten additional questions to be answered from the sources.

QUESTIONS

1. Why did Henry of Montmorency-Damville issue his protest on November 13, 1574?

2. Did he favor absolutism at that time? Explain his attitude.

3. Give evidence as to the weakness of the French monarchy in 1574. Account for it.

4. What is meant by the phrase "A state within a state?" Did such a situation exist in France in 1575?

5. As leader of the "Union and Confederation" did Henry of Montmorency-Damville have a definite program?

6. According to the "Articles" presented by Damville, January 12, 1575, did he consider himself absolute head of the "Union and Confederation?" Can you find evidence to prove that he really was an autocrat?

7. To what extent did the rivalry of the powerful feudal houses prolong the civil wars and weaken the monarchy?

8. How did the civil wars affect the status of the peasants?

9. What foreign nations were primarily interested in the French civil wars? Why?

10. Was Henry III a capable ruler? To what extent did his personal qualities affect his administration?

11. What part did Catherine de Médicis play in the affairs of her son, Henry III?

12. Enumerate the problems confronting Henry III in 1583. How did he try to solve them?

13. Why was Henry III interested in the meeting of Henry of Navarre and Henry of Montmorency-Damville at Castres in 1585?

14. What might have been the "good moves" and the "bad moves" the king referred to in his letter of March 8, 1585?

15. Did Navarre's reasons for meeting Damville at Castres, as stated by Henry III, on March 8, 1585, square with the motives expressed by Navarre in a letter to Segur, March 25, 1585? In your opinion what was Navarre's real purpose in arranging this meeting?

16. Who was Duplessis-Mornay? What was his real reason in writing to Henry of Montmorency-Damville on March 30, 1585?

17. Why was Spain especially interested in French affairs in 1585?

18. Why did Damville probably regret his "defection" from Henry of Navarre? When did they arrange their famous entente? What was its significance?

19. What event in 1584 helps to explain the acts of the Spaniards, Mornay, Damville, and

Navarre? [To find this event consult a history of sixteenth-century France.]

20. Why did Mornay in 1587 send his discourse on the high cost of living to Catherine de Médicis?

21. Why did prices increase in the sixteenth century?

22. Do you think Mornay's explanation of the high cost of living is correct? Would his reasons account for the increase of prices during the World War?

23. How did the religious wars affect social conditions in France?

24. When Henry of Navarre heard of the death of Henry III did he, as king, issue an important statement, outlining his plans for the future?

25. As king what was Henry IV's attitude toward the Huguenots?

26. What obstacles confronted the king in 1591?

27. Was Henry IV sincere in his attempts to consult his Estates General and to reestablish law and order?

28. Why did Henry of Montmorency-Damville intervene at Rome in the king's behalf?

29. In his reply to Damville, May 1, 1593, did the pope indicate what had to be done before Henry of Navarre could be recognized as Henry IV of France?

30. Was Henry of Montmorency-Damville, in

his letter to the pope, August 11, 1593, certain that the latter would recognize Henry IV as king, even after his conversion?

31. How did Henry IV plan to overcome the opposition of his nobles?

32. Were Henry IV and Sully agreed as to the proper methods to be used in dealing with the nobles?

33. What did the king promise Sully he would do after his authority had been established in France?

34. Did the king keep his promise?

35. How did Henry IV dispose of Épernon?

36. Did the king fear Henry of Montmorency-Damville? How did he handle this nobleman?

37. How did the monarch remove the Guise opposition?

38. What did Henry IV mean when he was reported to have said in 1596, "Now I am king?"

39. How did Henry IV settle the religious question? Did he adopt the Politique solution of the problem?

40. How did he strengthen the position of France as a continental power?

41. Why did he oppose the attempts of the English and the Dutch to prolong the war with Spain?

42. Why did the English and the Dutch want the war to continue?

43. How did Henry IV and Sully propose to

develop France along economic lines? Discuss their achievements.

44. Were they always agreed regarding economic policies?

45. Would their economic theories be considered sound at the present time?

46. Did Sully's religious views affect his economic beliefs?

47. What is mercantilism? Were Henry IV and Sully mercantilists?


48. In your opinion what was the prime object of the "Great Design?"

49. It has been said that the "Great Design" was nothing more than an attempt to establish the balance of power. Discuss.

50. Do you believe that the disorders and wars, together with the burden of the loss and cost of war influenced Henry IV and Sully to propose this plan of federation to end wars? Mention other plans of peace and order which appear to have been born of revolutions and wars.

51. Comment on the following: "The rise of Henry of Navarre to the kingship marked the triumph of the Politique cause and signified the beginning of the modern French state."

52. As a result of your study of these documents can you justify the absolutism established by Henry IV?



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